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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE 
STA1E OF UTAH 
MAURINE C. BAIRD, aka 
MAURINE C. SHURTLEFF, 
Plaintiff - Appellant, 
~vs-
IN1ERMOUNTAIN SCHOOL FEDERAL 
CREDIT UNION, 
Defendant - Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STAIEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by the plaintiff for special and 
punitive damages based on defendant's wrongful actions which resulted 
in plaintiff's incarceration in the Box Elder County Jail, violating 
her constitutional rights, 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court Judge, Venoy Christoffersen, dismissed the 
Complaint for its failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted, 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks a reversal of this dismissal and asks this 
Court to remand the case back to the District Court for the necessary 
discovery and trial. 
Case No, 
14451 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant filed a Complaint on a promissory note in the 
City Court of Brigham City, Box Elder County, on February 20, 1975 
(Tr 10 & 11). On March 25, 1975, the attorney and agent of the 
defendant sent a letter to the plaintiff (Tr 49), which reflects the 
dispute on the accounting in the matter and specifically stating: 
"Also, this letter should serve as notice to you that if I do not 
receive your payment in the full amount of Eight Hundred Thirty and 
61/100 Dollars ($830.61) or your answer to my Complaint within said 
five (5) day period, I will proceed to take Default Judgment against 
you." The plaintiff followed those instructions by sending an answer 
to the Complaint to the attorney as directed. The answer, however, 
was not filed with the Clerk of the Court and apparently is still 
being held by the attorneyo On May 20, 1975, the defendant forwarded 
to plaintiff an accounting reflecting that the full balance owing 
was Eight Hundred Three and 11/100 Dollars ($803.11), which amount 
was paid May 263 1975 (Tr 50 & 51). Subsequently, the harrassmSnt 
continued with supplemental orders, executions, bench warrants and 
finally, commitment in the Box Elder County Jail on August 1, 1975 
(Tr 25 thru 40), based upon a contempt of Court charge relating to 
this matter. Apparently, this commitment was for an indefinite 
period of time, although a release was obtained based upon a telephone 
conversation with plaintifffs attorney and Judge Daines, together with 
an agreement to provide One Hundred Sixty and 00/100 Dollars ($160.00) 
(Tr 41). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT IS NOT FAVORED BY THE COURTS AND RELIEF 
THEREFROM SHOULD BE GRANTED WHERE POSSIBLE. 
Long standing judicial and public policy requires that a default 
judgment should be voided whenever possible. As early as 1898, the 
Utah Supreme Court stated its opinion in this regardo Utah Coi^ ni^ ypj-^ X 
and Savings Bank v^  Trumbo.. 17 Utah 198, 53 P. 1033, 1036 (1898): 
"Such is not the law and the courts do not favor 
judgments by default. The policy of the law is 
that every man shall have his day in court before 
judgment shall be entered against him, ....Tr 
This aversion to default judgments has been restated more recently in 
Heathman v„ Fabian & Clendenin, 14 Utah 26 60, 377 P2d 189, 190 (1962): 
"Judgments by default are not favored by the courts 
nor are they in the interest of justice and fair play. 
No one has an inalienable or constitutional right to 
a judgment by default without a hearing on the merits. 
The courts, in the interest of justice and fair play, 
favor, where possible, a full and complete opportunity 
for a hearing on the merits of every case." 
See also Rule 55(c) and Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P.j MpKgan v, Mountain 
View Memorial Estates, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 323, 411 P2d 129 (1966); 
and Nev v. HarrisonT 5 Utah 2d 217, 299 P2d 1114 (1956). 
The reason behind the policy disfavoring default judgments is 
a basic one embraced by our society and found in "She Fourteenth 
Amendments guarantee that no State shall deprive any person of 
property without due process of law. In the landmark case of 
Fuentes v. Shevin. 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972) (cited for its 
reasoning and not its facts) the United States Supreme Court said: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-4-
TtThe constitutional right to be heard is a basic 
aspect of the duty of government to follow a fair 
process of decision making when it acts to deprive 
a person of his possessions," 
The default judgment against the plaintiff, Maurine C0 Baird, 
acted to drprive her of her property (money) and was wrongfully 
taken, thus violating her right to have her day in court and to 
be heardo 
POINT II 
THE COURT IMPROPERLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT ON THE GROUNDS 
THAT IT FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTEDo 
The defendant filed a Complaint against the plaintiff in the 
City Court of Brigham City, Box Elder County, Utah on the 20th day 
of February, 1975 (Tr 10 & 11). On February 26, 1975, the Sheriff 
served a summons on the plaintiff (Tr 15) which directed her to 
file an answer to the Complaint in the City Court within twenty (20) 
days, and to also send a copy of the answer to the defendants 
attorney (Tr 16). 
On March 25, 1975, defendants attorney superseded these 
instructions by sending plaintiff a letter which directed her to 
either pay the amount allegedly due or else send him an answer 
to the Complaint within five (5) days. Defendants attorney made 
no mention of filing an answer with the Court, but only requested 
that "I" receive an answer to "my" Complaint (Tr 49 )o Plaintiff 
complied with this request by mailing defendant an answer to the 
Complaint but, in spite of this, defendant's attorney proceeded 
to file a Precipe for Default Judgment on April 10, 1975 (Tr 18). 
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Plaintiff, not having the benefit of counsel arid being 
unskilled in the law, believed that she had complied with the 
law when she sent defendant's attorney an answer to the 
Complaint. The fact is the answer never found its way to the 
Clerk of the Court and is apparently still being held by defendant's 
attorney. Since plaintiff made a good faith effort to work within 
the judicial system, all doubts should be decided in her favor, 
especially since she was directly misguided by defendants attorney, 
who failed to execute that same good faith and file her answer with 
the court. Chrysler v. Chrysler. 5 Utah 2d 415, 303 P2d 995 (1956)Q 
Had he so filed the answer, the default judgment would have been 
prevented, and plaintiff would have had her day in court. As it 
now stands, she was precluded that right through defendant's 
attorney's misguidance and defendant should not be allowed to 
benefit because of that mis guidance <> 
In ..H^ thinan„..y#l.1..Fjabxan & Clendenin, supra, a case involving a 
default judgment, the court said: 
"If was clearly the duty of the law firm to do 
what it could acting fairly and openly, to prevent 
the court from entering a default judgment against 
Hatch without hearing its claim that the default 
certificate was obtained on account of excusable 
neglect•" 
In that case, the law firm had represented, in a prior suit, a 
party against whom a judgment of default was enteredo The law 
firm moved to set aside that judgment because of excusable 
neglect in failing to file a timely pleading. In this case, we 
have the lawyer representing the party in favor of whom the 
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default judgment was granted, and the other party unrepresented by 
counsel. But can there be any less of a duty imposed on the 
lawyer in. this case to prevent a default judgment by filing the 
answer to the pleadings when he has them in hand than there was 
in Heathman, supra? 
Rule 60(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that the court can relieve a party from a final judgment in the 
furtherance of justice when ihere has been misrepresentation or 
other.misconduct of ap adverse party. 
Although this provision more specifically applies to an 
appeal from, or motion to dismiss, a default judgment, which must 
be brought within three months of that judgment, it is clear that 
misguidance of adverse counsel is looked on with disfavor and 
shouldn't be tolerated. The present action is not an appeal from 
or motion to dismiss the default judgment rendered in the Brigham 
City Court, but is an independent cause of action based on defendant's 
attorney's misguidance in that case. Therefore, the time limita-
tions of Rule 60(b) do not apply. 
It is true that a timely appeal to the default judgment in the 
Brigham City Court would have given plaintiff the opportunity to 
have her dispute judicially determined, but not being represented by 
counsel she was unaware of that right. 
In Rule 60(b)(7), URCP, the rule continues to state that, 
besides all of the enumerated reasons for relieving a party from 
final judgment, that a party may also be relieved for any other 
reason that so justifies it. The failure of the defendant's attorney 
to file plaintiff's answer with the court and the subsequent harrass-
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ment which resulted in plaintiff being incarcerated are sufficient 
reasons within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(7) to justify relief. 
The trial court dismissed the present suit claiming that it 
failed to state a cause of action for which relief may be granted. 
It stated for reasoning that an appeal should have been taken 
from the default judgment and that the question could not be 
attacked collaterally (Tr 52), It is not disputed that a default 
judgment is considered a final judgment for the purposes of res 
judicata as is any other final judgment* Ziony s Ben.Bldg,o Soc, ya 
Gearv. 112 Utah 548, 189 P2d 964 (1948). But where certain 
improprieties appear with a default judgment, the courts have been 
quick to allow a collateral proceeding. Bowen v« Olsenj 121 Utah 299, 
246 P2d 602 (1952), can collaterally attack a void default judgment; 
Johnson v. Weinstern. 58 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1967), collateral attack of 
a default judgment is allowed when the relief granted is different 
than in the Complaint, and in .Kgyn y, MayyXap^Ca^ 
Baltimore Mdv. 112 F2d 352 (1940) at 356 the court said: 
"When a judgment by default is impugned, 
whatever may affect its competency or regularity 
is open to inquiry in a collateral proceeding." 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure further 
states that: 
"This rule does not limit the power of a court to 
entertain an independent action to relieve a party 
from a judgment, order or proceeding, or to set 
aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The 
procedure fqr obtaining any relief from a judgment 
shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules, 
or by an independent action." 
In Shaw v. CiIchgrT $ Utah 2d 222, 341 P2d 949 (1959), the 
court held that according to Rule 60(b), the plaintiff could not 
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make a motion seventeen months after a final judgment to set that 
decree aside^ It held that the issue must be raised in an indepen-
dent action and said at page 950: 
"The attack here being based on fraud upon the 
court, and having been leveled some 17 months 
after the adoption decree, must have been pursued 
in an independent action, and not by way of motion 
in the original action. Otherwise, the rule would 
not make much sense,TT 
See also McGavin v. McGavin. 27 Utah 2d 200, 494 P2d 283 (1972), 
The present action is also an independent action within the 
purview of Rule 60(b), therefore, the default judgment in the 
Brigham City Court is not res judicata as to this cause of action 
-and the trial court erred by dismissing plaintifffs case. 
CONCLUSION 
The default judgment against plaintiff was wrongfully taken 
in the Brigham City Court and defendant subsequently continued to 
harrass plaintiff through supplemental orders, executions and 
bench warrants, resulting in plaintiff!s incarceration. 
The District Court for Box Elder County erred when it dismissed 
this action considering the defendant's wrongful conduct in the City 
Court suit. 
Since plaintiff was precluded her constitutional rights by 
being deprived of her property and liberty, the dismissal of this 
case should be reversed and remanded to the District Court for the 
necessary trial and discovery. 
Respectfully submitted this 7 day of May, 1976. 
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